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SIXTH AMENDMENT-RIGHT TO
COUNSEL OF PRISONERS ISOLATED
IN ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION
United States v. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984).
I. INTRODUCTION
The sixth amendment guarantees the assistance of counsel to a
person accused of an offense in a criminal prosecution.' Precisely
when the right to counsel attaches, however, is unclear. Some
Supreme Court decisions hold that an individual is entitled to the
assistance of counsel only at or after the initiation of adversary judi-
cial proceedings.2 In contrast, other opinions find that the right to
counsel may attach prior to the initiation of formal judicial
proceedings.3
In United States v. Gouveia,4 the Supreme Court considered
1 The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 See United States v. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. 2292, 2297 (1984); Estelle v. Smith, 451
U.S. 454 (1981);Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932). A "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraign-
ment" can initiate adversary judicial proceedings. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2298 (quoting
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972)).
3 See Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2300-03 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 2303-04 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (all pretrial confronta-
tions should be reviewed in determining whether an accused is entitled to counsel);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (the right to counsel may attach prior to the
formal indictment); see also infra notes 71-74, 78-81, 103-05, 115-19 and accompanying
text.
4 104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984). United States v. Gouveia involved the consolidation of six
appellants' claims arising from two separate cases. In the first case, inmates Reynoso,
Segura, Ramirez, and Gouveia were convicted in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder in
the death of a fellow inmate. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. The inmates
appealed. United States v. Gouveia, 704 F.2d 1116, 1117 (9th Cir. 1983).
In the second case, inmates Mills and Pierce were indicted for the first degree mur-
der of a fellow inmate and the conveyance of a weapon in prison. See infra note 24. The
district court dismissed the charges on the grounds that Mills and Pierce had been de-
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whether the sixth amendment guarantees an indigent inmate the
right to counsel prior to indictment if the inmate is confined to ad-
ministrative detention and under criminal investigation. 5 The Court
held that an indigent inmate isolated in administrative segregation
is not entitled to appointed counsel prior to the initiation of adver-
sary judicial proceedings. 6 This decision departs from the Court's
prior emphasis on securing a fair trial for an "accused."
This Note begins with a summary of the facts in Gouveia. It then
reviews the Court's majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.
In the discussion, the Note analyzes how the Court's decision mis-
construes precedent and ignores important policy considerations.
The Note concludes that the inmates in Gouveia should have been
appointed counsel before the formal commencement of adversary
proceedings.
II. THE DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. GouVEIA
A. THE FACTS
On November 11, 1978, prison officials at the Federal Correc-
tional Institution in Lompoc, California, found inmate Thomas
"Hoppo" Trejo stabbed to death in cell A-18. 7 An autopsy dis-
closed that Trejo had received forty-five stab wounds around his
heart.8 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials and prison
authorities initiated independent investigations following Trejo's
death. 9 Prison officials immediately suspected that inmates Adolpho
nied their rights to counsel and speedy trial under the sixth amendment. United States
v. Mills, No. 80-278 (D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1980) (available Sept. 15, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Briefs file). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
dismissal and remanded for trial. United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 902 (1981). At the trial, Mills and Pierce were convicted of first degree
murder and conveyance of a weapon in prison. See infra note 24. The inmates appealed
their convictions. Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1117.
The court of appeals, sitting en banc, consolidated the inmates' appeals to consider
whether the appellants were denied their sixth amendment right to counsel while they
were confined to administrative segregation. Id. The Supreme Court's review focused
on the same issue. See Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2296 n.l.
5 104 S. Ct. at 2296. The Court specifically focused its review in Gouveia on inmates
who lacked the financial resources to retain private counsel. Id.
6 Id. at 2300.
7 Id. at 2295; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. 2292 (1984), rev' Gouveia, 704 F.2d
1116 (9th Cir. 1983) (available Sept. 15, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file)
[hereinafter cited as Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
8 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295; Brief for the United States, Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. 2292
(1984) (available Sept. 15, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file) [hereinafter cited
as Brief for United States].
9 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295. The United States Attorney's Office for the Central
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Reynoso and William Gouveia had murdered Trejo.10 At that time,
they placed Reynoso and Gouveia in the institution's Administrative
Detention Unit (ADU).1
The FBI interviewed Gouveia about his knowledge of Trejo's
murder on December 6, 1978.12 Later that month, prison officials
continued their investigation of the stabbing incident by conducting
disciplinary hearings.' 3 During the hearings, prison authorities con-
cluded that Respondents were involved in Trejo's murder.' 4 Ac-
cordingly, they ordered that Respondents remain isolated in the
ADU. 15 Despite Respondents' repeated requests for appointed
counsel, 16 they were not afforded the assistance of counsel during
District of California also opened a file on Trejo's murder and assigned a staff member
to investigate the incident by November 29, 1978. Brief for Respondent William
Gouveia, Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2292 (1984) (available Sept. 15, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Briefs file) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Gouveia].
10 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295. Prison officials later linked inmates Robert Ramirez
and Philip Segura to the alleged murder. Id. Because the charges against Ramirez and
Segura were identical to those facing Gouveia and Reynoso, this casenote limits its dis-
cussion to Gouveia and Reynoso. See supra note 4.
11 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295; see also infra note 15 and accompanying text. Reynoso
was released from administrative detention on November 22, 1978. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct.
at 2295. Following further inquiries into the stabbing, however, prison authorities re-
turned Reynoso to the ADU on December 4, 1978. Id.
12 Brief for Gouveia, supra note 9. The FBI agent read Gouveia his rights prior to the
interview "as if he were an accused in a criminal case." Id.
13 When inmates violate prison regulations, they generally are subjected to a discipli-
nary hearing. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1983); Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 562 (1974). Prison authorities use disciplinary proceedings to evaluate
the inmates' alleged misconduct and to impose appropriate sanctions. Wolff, 418 U.S. at
562. Disciplinary hearings also elicit confrontations between "inmates who are being
disciplined and those who would. . . furnish evidence against them." Id.
14 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295.
15 Id. The Code of Federal Regulations provides the following description of admin-
istrative detention: "Administrative detention is the status of confinement of an inmate
in a special housing unit in a cell either by himself or with other inmates which serves to
remove the inmate from the general population." 28 C.F.R. § 541.22 (1982). A prison
warden may "place an inmate in administrative detention when the inmate's continued
presence in the general population poses a serious threat to. . . other inmates or to the
security or orderly running of the institution," when the inmate is awaiting a hearing for
or investigation of a violation of prison regulations, and when the inmate is awaiting
"investigation or trial for a criminal act." Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295.
Inmates confined to administrative segregation face more restrictions on their daily
activities than inmates in the general prison population. In Gouveia, for example, Re-
spondents could not interact with inmates in the general prison population while they
were detained in the ADU. 704 F.2d at 1118. In addition, Respondents lost the oppor-
tunity to participate in many prison programs. Id. Respondents, however, did retain
access to legal materials, regular visitation rights, daily exercise periods, unmonitored
phone calls, and the right to hire private counsel. Id.
16 Brief for United States, supra note 8. Although "inmates held in administrative
detention are not denied access to counsel," Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1119, each respondent
in this case lacked the financial resources to hire an attorney. Id. Thus, Gouveia specifi-
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either their disciplinary hearings or their confinement in administra-
tive segregation.1 7
In June, 1980, a federal grand jury indicted Respondents on
two charges: first degree murder and conspiracy to commit mur-
der.18 Respondents did not obtain appointed counsel, however, un-
til their arraignment in federal court on July 14, 1980.19 Thus,
Respondents were confined in administrative detention for over
twenty months without the assistance of appointed counsel.20
Before their trial began, Respondents sought the dismissal of
their indictments. 21 The district court denied the motion to dismiss,
and Respondents were forced to trial.22 At trial, Respondents were
convicted of both murder and conspiracy to commit murder.23 Re-
spondents appealed their convictions to the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. 24
cally decides whether the sixth amendment guarantees indigent inmates the appoint-
ment of counsel while confined in administrative segregation. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
17 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295.
18 Id. Respondents were charged with first degree murder in violation of Section
1111 of the United States Code, as well as conspiracy to commit murder pursuant to
Section 1117 of the United States Code. Section 1111 (a) provides:
(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every
murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate,
malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt
to perpetrate, any arson, rape, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated from a premedi-
tated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being
other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree.
Any other murder is murder in the second degree.
18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1976).
Section 1117 defines conspiracy to commit murder as follows:
If two or more persons conspire to violate sections 1111, 1114, or 1116 of this
title, and one or more of such persons do any overt act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 1117 (Supp. 1983).
19 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295.
20 Id.
21 Id. In support of their motion to dismiss the indictments against them, Respon-
dents posited three arguments: (1) the 19-month delay between the stabbing incident
and the grand jury indictment violated their fifth amendment right to due process; or
alternatively, (2) that their 20-month isolation in the ADU without appointed counsel
infringed on their sixth amendment right to counsel; and (3) that the lengthy delay
before indictment violated their right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment. Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. For a further description of the offenses, see supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
24 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295. As note 4, supra, states, Gouveia addressed the consoli-
dated appeals of six respondents from two separate cases. The case involving four of
the respondents, Gouveia, Reynoso, Segura and Ramirez, is discussed in the text and
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In a closely divided opinion, 25 the court of appeals, sitting en
banc, reversed the appellants' convictions. 26 The court limited its
review to whether the sixth amendment guarantees the appointment
of counsel to indigent inmates prior to indictment if the inmates are
isolated in administrative detention and under investigation for
criminal activities. 27 The majority of the court of appeals held that
under these circumstances, the sixth amendment requires the ap-
pointment of counsel to an indigent inmate confined in the ADU for
more than ninety days. 28 Accordingly, the court found that Respon-
preceding footnotes. The facts of the case relating to the remaining two respondents,
Mills and Pierce, are discussed below.
On August 22, 1979, inmate Thomas Hall was murdered in the "E" unit of the
Federal Correctional Institution in Lompoc, California. Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 7. Hall was stabbed 10 times with a knife made in prison. Id. Prison authori-
ties suspected inmates Robert Mills and Richard Pierce of Hall's murder and confined
them to the ADU. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295. The prison records indicate that respon-
dents were isolated in the ADU "pending investigation or trial for a criminal act." Mills,
No. 80-278.
In early September, the Unit Disciplinary Committee, comprised of the inmates'
counselor and case managers, conducted a disciplinary hearing concerning Mills and
Pierce. Id. At that hearing, the Committee informed Mills and Pierce that "based on
confidential sources, the government had concluded that they were responsible for the
murder of Thomas Hall." Id. During the hearing, the Committee denied respondents'
repeated request for appointed counsel. Id. About September 13, 1979, prison author-
ities summoned the inmates to a hearing in front of the Institutional Disciplinary Com-
mittee conducted by senior prison administrators. Id. Again, prison officials told Mills
and Pierce that "they were guilty of the Hall murder." Id. They ordered that Mills and
Pierce continue to be detained in administrative segregation. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at
2295. Prison authorities again denied Respondents' request for appointed counsel.
Mills, No. 80-278.
On March 27, 1980, after seven months in the ADU, a federal grand jury indicted
Respondents on charges of first degree murder and conveyance of a weapon in prison.
Id. Inmate Pierce also was charged With assault. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2296. Respon-
dents were not appointed counsel until their arraignment on April 21, 1980. Id. At that
time, they were released from the ADU. Id. Thus, Mills and Pierce were isolated in
administrative detention for eight months without access to appointed counsel. Id.
Before their trial began, Respondents filed a motion seeking the dismissal of their
indictments. Id. at 2296. Respondents argued that their eight-month detention in the
ADU without the appointment of counsel violated their sixth amendment right to coun-
sel. Id. In addition, Respondents claimed that the lengthy delay before their indictment
violated their fifth amendment right to due process and their sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial. Id. The district court dismissed the indictment. Id. The court of appeals,
however, reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for trial. Id. At
trial, Respondents were convicted on all counts. Id. Respondents appealed their convic-
tions. Id.
25 Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1116. The court of appeals decided to reverse the convictions
by a vote of 6-5.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1119.
28 Id. at 1125. To qualify for appointed counsel under the sixth amendment in cases
like this one, the court of appeals stated that the inmate must:
(1) be held in isolation for more than 90 days,
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dents' sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated 29 by
their twenty-month isolation in administrative detention.30 Thus,
the court reversed Respondents' convictions and dismissed their
indictments .31
In reaching its decision, the majority of the court of appeals
distinguished Gouveia from other right to counsel cases because
Gouveia involved prisoners. 32 The majority stated that although a
suspect must be accused to be guaranteed the right to counsel, sus-
pects already incarcerated and subjected to prison authority may be
accused for purposes of the sixth amendment when suspects outside
of prison are not.33 To determine what constitutes an accusation for
purposes of the sixth amendment, the majority established a test de-
(2) request the assistance of counsel,
(3) establish indigency, and
(4) show that one of the reasons he is confined to the ADU is because he is being
investigated for a criminal act or awaiting trial.
Id. at 1124. Once the inmate has established these elements, prison officials have three
options. They may (1) show that the inmate is not being detained because an investiga-
tion is underway or a trial for a criminal act is pending, (2) appoint counsel, or (3) re-
lease the inmate from the ADU into the general prison population. Id.
The court of appeals, relying on current federal prison regulations, see 28 C.F.R.
§ 541.11 (1982), decided that an indigent inmate confined to the ADU because of a
pending criminal investigation is entitled to appointed counsel after 90 days in isolation.
Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1124. Prison regulations specify that one may be confined in the
ADU for disciplinary reasons for a maximum of 90 days. Id. The 90-day limit consists of
a maximum 30 days in isolation while awaiting a disciplinary hearing and 60 days in
disciplinary segregation. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that "[ilsolation for more
than ninety days . . . is necessarily for some purpose other than discipline." Id.
29 704 F.2d at 1125.
30 Id. at 1118.
31 Id. at 1127. The court also reversed the convictions of respondents Mills and
Pierce and dismissed the indictments against them. Id.
32 Id. at 1120. The majority recognized that in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)
(plurality opinion), the Court held that the right to counsel attaches only at or after the
initiation of formal adversary proceedings. 704 F.2d at 1119-20. The court of appeals,
however, declined to follow Kirby because it did not address the peculiar situation of
inmates confined in prison. Id. at 1120.
33 704 F.2d at 1120. The majority noted that an inmate suspected of committing a
crime in prison encounters different obstacles than a suspect outside of prison. Id. at
1122. Upon arrest, a suspect outside of prison is arraigned without a lengthy delay. Id.
(citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)). When a suspect is already in prison, however, "[flormal
charges need not be brought until the government is ready for trial because the suspect
can be isolated without being arrested." Id. at 1122. Thus, the standard used to trigger
the right to counsel for suspects outside a prison may be ineffective in a prison setting.
For example, if an arrest is required to trigger the right to counsel, an inmate may be
effectively accused of a criminal act in prison but nevertheless be denied the assistance
,of appointed counsel because the inmate was not "arrested" in connection with the al-
leged offense. See id. The court of appeals concluded that "[t]o insist that an inmate is
not 'accused' until formal charges are initiated is to ignore reality." Id. But see infra note
44 and accompanying text.
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rived from the reasoning of a sixth amendment speedy trial case.34
The test requires a complete evaluation of the federal authorities'
conduct in connection with the suspect.3 5 Using this test, if the gov-
ernment's actions elicited the conduct the sixth amendment guaran-
tee was designed to prevent, the suspect may be "accused" for
purposes of the sixth amendment.3 6
After applying this test to the facts of Gouveia, the majority of
the court of appeals concluded that, in Gouveia, administrative de-
tention served an accusatory purpose.3 7 The majority classified Re-
spondents' confinement in the ADU as accusatory because
Respondents were being investigated for criminal activities while
isolated in administrative segregation.38 Furthermore, the majority
found that Respondents had confronted government prosecutorial
forces prior to indictment.3 9 In addition, the majority explained
that confining Respondents to the ADU for more than ninety days
impeded their ability to prepare an adequate defense because they
were unable to investigate the criminal charges against them.40 Ac-
cordingly, the majority held that Respondents were denied their
sixth amendment right to counsel during their extended isolation in
administrative detention.4 1
The dissent in the court of appeals opinion, however, con-
cluded that none of Respondents' constitutional rights had been vi-
olated.42 The dissent found that the right to counsel guaranteed by
the sixth amendment is triggered only by the initiation of adversary
judicial criminal proceedings, 43 whether the suspect is in prison or
34 Id. at 1120 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971)); see also infra notes
43, 58-62 and accompanying text.
35 Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1120; see "aso Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485-86 (where the Court
found that police officers' antagonistic conduct during preindictment interrogation was
sufficient to render the petitioner accused).
36 Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1120. The sixth amendment right to counsel guarantee was
designed to prevent (1) situations where a suspect would be required to stand alone
against government prosecutorial forces, and (2) prejudice to a suspect's right to fair
trial. See Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2298; see also infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
37 Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1120.
38 Id.
39 Id. As a result of prison disciplinary proceedings, prison officials found Respon-
dents guilty of murder and subjected them to prison discipline. Id.
40 Id. at 1122.
41 Id. at 1125.
42 Id. at 1129 (Wright, J, dissenting).
43 Id. at 1127 (Wright, J., dissenting). The dissent relied upon Kirby, 406 U.S. 682
(1972), for the proposition that the right to counsel attaches only at or after the initia-
tion of formal adversary proceedings. According to Kirby, adversary judicial proceed-
ings include the "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or
arraignment." 406 U.S. at 688-89; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
By contrast, the dissent noted that the sixth amendment right to speedy trial may
1984]
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not.44 The dissent also noted that even without relying on the sixth
amendment right to counsel to ensure a fair trial, Respondents had
adequate protection against government interference with the prep-
aration of their case.45 Both the "ethical responsibility" required of
the government prosecutor and the due process standards in the
Constitution guarantee fairness in the adversary criminal process.
46
The Supreme Court granted certiorari,47 limited to the issue of
whether the sixth amendment entitles an indigent inmate the assist-
ance of appointed counsel prior to the formal indictment proceed-
ing if prison authorities confine the inmate to administrative
detention while the inmate's involvement in a criminal act is being
investigated. 48
B. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision,49
holding that Respondents were not entitled to the assistance of
counsel during their preindictment segregation in the ADU.50 More
specifically, the majority found that "the right to counsel attaches
only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings
against the defendant." 5' The majority based its opinion on prior
court decisions that considered the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel outside a prison setting.
52
The majority found that both the language and the purpose of
the sixth amendment support the conclusion that the right to coun-
sel attaches only at or after the start of adversary judicial proceed-
attach at points other than the formal initiation of adversary criminal proceedings.
Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1127 (Wright, J., dissenting). The dissent contended, however, that
the majority confused the sixth amendment right to counsel with the sixth amendment
guarantee of speedy trial when it ruled that an inmate confined to the ADU for more
than 90 days while being investigated for a criminal act stands accused for purposes of
the sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. (Wright, J., dissenting). The right to counsel
extends only to trial-like confrontations between the suspect and federal authorities. Id.
(Wright, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent concluded that, until indicted, Respondents
"faced no confrontation for which the right to counsel was designed." Id. (Wright, J.,
dissenting); see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 58-62 and
accompanying text.
44 Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1127-28 (Wright, J., dissenting). But see supra notes 32-33 and
accompanying text.
45 Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1128 (Wright, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 64-69.
46 704 F.2d at 1128 (Wright, J., dissenting).
47 United States v. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. 272 (1983).
48 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2296; see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
49 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2300. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion. He was
joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Powell, and White.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 2297; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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ings.53 First, the Court found that the sixth amendment specifies
the presence of both a "criminal prosecution" and an "accused" in
connection with the right to counsel. 54 The majority held that an
inmate is not accused until the initiation of formal adversary pro-
ceedings because it is not until that point that the government actu-
ally has committed itself to prosecute the inmate. 55 Second, the
Court held that the purpose underlying the right to counsel is to
guarantee to the accused the assistance of counsel "at critical con-
frontations with his adversary."' 56 Thus, the majority found that in-
mates confined in administrative detention have no right to
appointed counsel prior to the initiation of adversary proceedings
because, before that time, inmates are not confronted by exper-
ienced public prosecutors and the intricacies of criminal law.57
The Court also rejected the analogy, relied on by the court of
appeals, that because the sixth amendment right to speedy trial can
attach before the initiation of formal adversary proceedings, 5 the
right to counsel also attaches prior to the commencement of formal
proceedings in some situations. 59 The Court held that the right to
counsel and the right to speedy trial are distinct rights designed to
protect different interests.60 The right to counsel protects individu-
als during trial-like confrontations with prosecutors. 61 The right to
speedy trial, however, protects individuals against undue impair-
53 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2298.
54 Id.; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
55 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2298 (citing Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689). Although the majority
did not address specifically what constitutes a "criminal prosecution," the majority im-
plied that proceedings including a "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, in-
formation, or arraignment" would satisfy the criminal prosecution requirement. Id. at
2298.
56 Id. Critical confrontations between the accused and their adversary traditionally
occur at trial. In cases where an individual is confronted with an expert adversary and
intricate legal issues before trial, however, the Court has extended the right to counsel
to pretrial proceedings. Id.; see also Wade, 388 U.S. at 224. Pretrial proceedings are clas-
sified as critical confrontations when the results of the proceeding might settle the ac-
cused's fate and render the trial meaningless. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2298.
57 The majority reasoned that "the average defendant does not have the professional
legal skill to protect himself" when confronted with the complexities of criminal law and
the experience of a government prosecutor. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2298 (quotingjohn-
son, 304 U.S. at 462-63).
58 Id. at 2299; see also supra note 44. The Court's sixth amendment speedy trial cases
have held that the right to speedy trial may attach as early as "arrest and holding [the
suspect] to answer a criminal charge." Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2299 (quoting United
States v. McDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1982)).
59 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2299; see also supra note 43.
60 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2299; see also supra note 43.
61 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2299 (citing McDonald, 456 U.S. at 8). For additional back-
ground on the right to counsel, see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
1984] 787
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
ments of their liberty.62
Although the Court recognized that the sixth amendment guar-
antee of representation by counsel enhances the fairness of an ac-
cused's trial, 63 the Court held that appointing indigent inmates
counsel prior to their indictment is not necessary to ensure this
right.64 The majority found that the fifth amendment guarantee of
due process 65 and the statute of limitations associated with each of-
fense 66 adequately protect inmates' rights to a fair trial prior to the
initiation of formal proceedings. 67 The Court held that the due pro-
cess protection, and implicitly statutes of limitation, require the dis-
missal of a case against an accused should delay in the initiation of
formal proceedings prejudice an accused's defense. 68 Thus, order-
ing the appointment of counsel prior to the initiation of formal ad-
versary proceedings was unnecessary. 69
C. THE CONCURRING OPINION
AlthoughJustice Stevens, joined byJustice Brennan, concurred
in the judgment reached by the Court that Respondents had no
62 Specifically, the majority explained the purpose of the right to speedy trial as
follows:
[T]he speedy trial right exists primarily to protect an individual's liberty interest, 'to
minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser,
but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while
released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by an arrest and the
presence of unresolved criminal charges.'
Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2299 (quoting McDonald, 456 U.S. at 8).
63 See supra note 36.
64 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2299.
65 The majority explained the function of the fifth amendment due process clause as
follows:
The Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment even if it is brought
within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the government's
delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over
him and that it caused him actual prejudice in presenting his defense.
Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1977);
Marion, 404 U.S. at 324).
66 The statute of limitations applicable to each offense protects an inmate against the
potential prejudice of extended preindictment delays by prohibiting the prosecution
from bringing stale charges against him. Id. (citing Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 788-89; Marion,
404 U.S. at 322).
67 Id. at 2299; see also supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. The majority in the
court of appeals decision raised the possibility that prejudice to an inmate's rights could
arise from preindictment delays. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. The
court of appeals held that a delay in the initiation of formal adversary proceedings would
prejudice the inmates' rights if the government used the delay to prepare a case against
the inmates while they were isolated in the ADU without the assistance of appointed
counsel. Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1122.




right to appointed counsel prior to indictment, 70 Justice Stevens
wrote separately to emphasize two points. First, Justice Stevens
found that, contrary to the majority's position, the Court's prior de-
cisions recognize that an accused may have a right to assistance of
counsel prior to the initiation of formal adversary proceedings. 7 1
Justice Stevens contended that these cases established a test to pro-
vide an accused with counsel if the accused needed the assistance of
counsel at a particular pretrial confrontation to preserve a fair
trial. 72 Second, Justice Stevens asserted that suspects can be "suffi-
ciently 'accused'" prior to the commencement of formal charges
against them to trigger the sixth amendment right to counsel.73 Jus-
tice Stevens reasoned that if authorities confront suspects to facili-
tate the development of cases against them, then these suspects
have become accused and have a right to counsel even though no
formal charges have been filed against them.74
Justice Stevens found no evidence, however, that Respondents'
confinement in the ADU served an accusatorial function.75 Because
Respondents were not accused, Justice Stevens found no reason to
determine whether the failure to appoint counsel prior to the initia-
tion of formal proceedings jeopardized Respondents' rights to a fair
trial.76 Thus, the concurrence concluded that failing to provide Re-
spondents with appointed counsel while they were isolated in the
ADU did not violate the sixth amendment.77
70 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
71 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). See also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
72 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2302 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 227).
The concurringJustices recognized that the right to counsel under the sixth amendment
was contingent upon the nature of the confrontation between the accused and the State
as opposed to the formal initiation of adversary proceedings. The concurrence asserted
that "in addition to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need
not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in
court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair
trial." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 226).
73 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
74 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 2303 (Stevens, J., concurring). The concurring Justices assumed Respon-
dents were confined to the ADU for security reasons. Id. (Stevens,J., concurring). They
found no evidence that Respondents were isolated in administrative detention to aid
prosecutorial efforts or to facilitate an investigation of the inmates' murders. Id. (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). But see supra notes 9, 24 and accompanying text; infra notes 82-83
and accompanying text.
76 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2303 (Stevens, J., concurring).
77 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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D. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Marshall dissented from the Court's holding. 78 He con-
tended that the scope of the sixth amendment right to counsel is not
restricted to confrontations that occur at or after the commence-
ment of the formal adversary process. 79 The dissent claimed that
the Constitution guarantees an individual who is effectively "ac-
cused" 80 the assistance of appointed counsel before the initiation of
formal judicial proceedings. 8'
In this case, Justice Marshall found that respondents' preindict-
ment segregation in the ADU did serve an accusatorial function.8 2
The dissent noted that the government partially justified detaining
Respondents in administrative segregation because federal officials
were investigating them on criminal charges. 83 Given the govern-
ment's statement, Justice Marshall concluded that prison authorities
denied Respondents their constitutional right to counsel when they
refused Respondents' requests for appointed counsel during their
preindictment isolation in the ADU.8 4
78 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. But
see supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
80 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. Justice Marshall agreed with the
concurring Justices that individuals effectively are accused when they are deprived of
their liberty or subjected to investigations that will further the prosecution's efforts to
convict them. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2304 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2303-04 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 2304 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
83 The government's admission about pending criminal investigations pertained to
all six respondents. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2304 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The dissent further supported its conclusion with respect to Mills and Pierce with
the factual findings of the district court. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The district court
had found the following:
By the evening of August 22, 1979, when the defendants were placed in segrega-
tion, the finger of suspicion had already been pointed toward them. As government
counsel conceded during argument, had the defendants been at large on the eve-
ning of the murder, under the circumstances of this case they would have been
promptly arrested, taken before a magistrate and provided with counsel.
Mills, No. 80-278; see also supra note 24.
84 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2305 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Because the majority dis-
posed of the sixth amendment issue by finding that no constitutional rights had been
abridged, see supra note 50 and accompanying text, it did not have to address the issue of
what remedy would have been appropriate. Id. at 2304 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Be-
cause Justice Marshall found that the court of appeals correctly held that Respondents'
sixth amendment rights had been violated, he had to determine an appropriate remedy.
Id. at 2304-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
Justice Marshall concluded that the court of appeals' decision to dismiss the indictments
against Respondents was correct. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2305 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Although the Court found that limiting the right to counsel
only to periods at or after the initiation of formal adversary proceed-
ings is consistent with its prior decisions, a close reading of the
Court's prior decisions does not support this conclusion. Indeed,
the decision in Gouveia departs from the Court's prior emphasis on
guaranteeing the representation of counsel necessary to ensure in-
dividuals assistance when they are confronted with the adversarial
forces of the State and to facilitate a fair trial. These important pol-
icy considerations suggest that an individual may be entitled to the
assistance of counsel before formal judicial proceedings commence.
A. APPLICATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS TO GOUVEIA
The Gouveia majority relied on its decisions in Brewer v. Wil-
liams,85 Coleman v. Alabama,8 6 and United States v. Wade8 7 to reach its
conclusion that the right to counsel attaches only at or after the for-
mal initiation of adversary proceedings.8 8 Although the fact pat-
terns in each of these cases involved confrontations after the
initiation of adversary proceedings, 9 the language in these deci-
sions definitely extended the right to counsel to situations occurring
prior to the commencement of formal adversary proceedings. In
addition, the Court's holdings in United States v. Ash, 90 Escobedo v.
85 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
86 399 U.S. 1 (1969).
87 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
88 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
89 In Williams, Coleman, and Wade, formal adversary proceedings clearly had com-
menced prior to the incidents that triggered the right to counsel inquiry. For example,
in Williams, the Court addressed the respondent's right to counsel during a postarraign-
ment interrogation. 430 U.S. at 390-93. In Coleman, the Court considered whether the
petitioners were entitled to appointed counsel during a preliminary hearing. 399 U.S. at
8-10. In Wade, the Court deliberated whether subjecting the respondent to a post-
indictment lineup in the absence of his attorney violated his sixth amendment right to
counsel. 388 U.S. at 227-28.
See also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (an individual indicted for murder who
was subjected to a psychiatric examination while held in prison was entitled to the assist-
ance of counsel during the examination); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)
(incriminating statements deliberately elicited by federal agents from an individual free
on bail after indictment for narcotics activities in the absence of his attorney deprived
the individual of the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment).
Accordingly, the Court has had few, if any, opportunities to evaluate whether an
individual should be afforded the assistance of counsel before the initiation of formal
judicial proceedings. Thus, the majority's narrow interpretation of the right to counsel
in Gouveia may be explained by the Court's effort to act consistently with its prior deci-
sions instead of focusing on the language and spirit of the sixth amendment.
90 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
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Illinois,9' and Miranda v. Arizona9 2 extended the right to counsel to
incidents before the formal initiation of judicial proceedings.
In Brewer v. Williams,9 3 for example, the Court found that police
officers deprived respondent Williams of his constitutional right to
assistance by counsel when they subjected Williams to a postar-
raignment interrogation in the absence of his attorney. 94 In Wil-
liams, however, the Court did not limit the right to counsel to
situations that occur after the origination of the formal adversary
process. The Williams Court held that, at a minimum, the sixth
amendment guarantees an individual the right to counsel at or after
the point when formal judicial proceedings commence against
him.9 5 Although the facts in Williams did not require the Court to
articulate a broad interpretation of the scope of the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel, 96 the Court's language in Williams certainly
did not preclude the possibility that one may be entitled to the
assistance of counsel prior to the initiation of adversary proceedings
in a situation like that in Gouveia.97
Similarly, the language in both Coleman v. Alabama9" and United
States v. Wade99 indicates that the right to counsel may attach before
formal adversary proceedings commence. The Court in Coleman
held that the sixth amendment guarantees individuals representa-
tion by counsel at critical pretrial confrontations, including prelimi-
nary hearings, arraignments, and pretrial lineups. 00 In Wade, the
Court found that the sixth amendment entitled the respondent to
91 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
92 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
93 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
94 Id. at 397-99.
95 Id. at 398.
96 In Williams, police officers transported respondent Williams from Davenport to
Des Moines after he had been arrested and arraigned. Id. at 390-93. During the trip,
the officers questioned Williams about the disappearance of a girl they thought he mur-
dered. Id. Later at trial, the district court held that the information obtained during the
trip to Des Moines was inadmissible as evidence because Williams had been denied his
sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 394-95. The Supreme Court subsequently af-
firmed that Williams was entitled to representation by counsel when he was interrogated
by government officers because the adversary process had already commenced against
him. Id. at 401. Because the adversary process clearly had commenced when the right
to counsel issue arose, however, the Brewer Court did not consider the circumstances
under which the right to counsel might attach if the adversary process had not yet been
initiated.
97 See supra note 95 and accompanying text; see also Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2300 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring).
98 399 U.S. 1 (1969).
99 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
100 Coleman, 399 U.S. at 7-10.
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the assistance of counsel during a postindictment lineup.'10 Despite
the references in the holdings of Coleman and Wade to situations after
the formal initiation of adversary proceedings, the language in those
cases in no way restricts the right to counsel to incidents that follow
the commencement of formal criminal proceedings. Coleman
adopted the language of Wade concerning the right to counsel.'0 2
The language in Wade suggests that an individual is entitled to rep-
resentation by counsel prior to the initiation of the formal adversary
process. Specifically, the Court held that a court must "scrutinize
any pretrial confrontation to determine whether the presence of
counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair
trial."' 0 3 To determine whether an attorney's presence was re-
quired in a specific situation, the Wade Court focused on the nature
of the confrontation between the suspect and the State rather than
whether formal adversary proceedings had been initiated against the
accused.' 0 4 Moreover, in Wade, the Court found that the sixth
amendment guarantees the assistance of counsel "whenever neces-
sary to assure a meaningful 'defence [sic].' "105 Indeed, the lan-
guage in Wade extends the right to counsel to potentially prejudicial
confrontations that occur before the initiation of formal judicial pro-
ceedings. Based on the Court's language in Wade, the Gouveia ma-
jority erred in holding that Respondents were not entitled to the
assistance of appointed counsel during their isolation in the ADU
simply because formal adversary proceedings had not commenced.
Support for the position that the right to counsel attaches
before the formal initiation of adversary proceedings is not limited
to the language of prior Court decisions. The Court's findings in
United States v. Ash,' 0 6 Escobedo v. Illinois,'0 7 and Miranda v. Arizona'08
also support the conclusion that an individual is entitled to repre-
101 Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37.
102 See Coleman, 399 U.S. 1 (1969). Because Coleman adopted the language of Wade
concerning the right to counsel, only the language and reasoning of Wade are discussed
in the text.
103 Wade, 388 U.S. at 227 (emphasis in original); see Coleman, 399 U.S. at 7. To analyze
whether a specific situation requires the presence of counsel, the Wade Court focused on
two issues: (1) whether the particular confrontation could substantially prejudice the
defendant's rights, and (2) whether the presence of counsel would reduce that prejudice
and facilitate a fair trial. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227; see also Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9.
104 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 226; see also Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2302 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
105 Wade, 388 U.S. at 224-25 (emphasis added).
106 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
107 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
108 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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sentation by counsel prior to the commencement of the formal crim-
inal process.
In United States v. Ash, the Court developed a test to determine
when an individual is entitled to the assistance of counsel. 0 9 The
test called for "an examination of the event in order to determine
whether the accused required aid in coping with legal problems or
assistance in meeting his adversary." 1 0 Although originally the
right to counsel guarantee was designed to insure an accused the
assistance of counsel at trial,"' later the right to counsel was ex-
tended to critical pretrial events where the accused needed assist-
ance. 12 The Court in Ash held that a pretrial lineup may trigger the
sixth amendment right to counsel 1 3 because an accused's fate may
be decided by the "trial" that occurs at the pretrial confrontation as
opposed to in the courtroom.' "4 Thus, the right to counsel guaran-
tee was not restricted to events following the formal initiation of
judicial proceedings.
In Escobedo v. Illinois, police held the petitioner in custody and
interrogated him about a fatal shooting before indictment. 115 The
Court held that in this context, petitioner had a right to counsel
even though formal adversary proceedings had not been initiated at
the time of interrogation. 1 6 The Court noted that when the peti-
tioner's request to consult with his attorney was denied, the investi-
109 The Court considered whether an accused has the right to counsel at a postindict-
ment photo display conducted by the government to determine whether a potential wit-
ness can identify the alleged offender. 413 U.S. at 303. The Court found that the
pretrial photo identification was unlikely to prejudice the accused. Id. at 317. The
Court held that because the accused was not present during the photo display, he was
not confronted with the prosecutorial forces of his adversary. Id. Thus, the sixth
amendment does not guarantee the assistance of counsel at the photographic identifica-
tion session. Id. at 321.
110 Id. at 313.
111 Id. at 309.
112 Id. at 310-11.
113 Using its test as a guide, the Court in Ash confirmed its decision in Wade that an
individual is entitled to representation by counsel during a critical pretrial lineup. Id. at
314. Although the pretrial lineup in Wade took place after the indictment, see Wade, 388
U.S. at 219-20, the rationale for providing the assistance of counsel at a postindictment
lineup is also applicable to a lineup that occurs before the formal initiation of adversary
proceedings. In Ash, the Court found that the right to counsel may attach at any lineup
that resembles a trial-like confrontation where counsel would "render '[a]ssistance' in
counterbalancing any 'overreaching' by the prosecution." Ash, 413 U.S. at 314.
114 413 U.S. at 311 (citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 235-36).
115 378 U.S. at 479.
116 Id. at 485. The dissent in Kirby, 406 U.S. at 697 (plurality opinion), agreed with
the Court in Escobedo that the right to counsel guarantee should not be affected by the
commencement of formal adversary proceedings. The dissent argued that " 'The initia-
tion of adversary judicial criminal proceedings' is completely irrelevant to whether coun-
sel is necessary at a pretrial confrontation in order to safeguard the accused's
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gation was no longer a general inquiry into "an unsolved crime."'1 17
Under these circumstances, the Court held that "[pletitioner had
become accused, and the purpose of the interrogation was to 'get
him' to confess his guilt." 118 The Court concluded that when the
pre-indictment interrogation shifts from investigatory to accusatory
and seeks a confession from the suspect, the accused is entitled to
the assistance of counsel based on the sixth amendment.119
In Miranda v. Arizona, the suspect was held in police custody and
interrogated before formal charges had been filed against him.' 20
The Court held that a suspect is guaranteed the assistance of an
attorney during custodial interrogation to reduce the possibility of
prejudice resulting from abuse of the interrogation process.' 2 '
The decisions of the Court in Ash, Escobedo, and Miranda do not
support the position of the majority in Gouveia that the "right to
counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary proceedings
have been initiated."' 22 Instead, those cases conclude that the right
to counsel may be triggered before adversary proceedings begin. In
Ash, the Court recognized that the accused may need the assistance
of counsel before formal proceedings begin to effectively deal with
complex legal questions and experienced adversaries.123 Both Esco-
bedo and Miranda emphasize that an individual is entitled to repre-
constitutional rights to confrontation and the effective assistance of counsel at his trial."
Id.
117 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485 (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 317 (1960)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
118 Id. at 485. The Court found that at the time of the interrogation, "[p]etitioner
had, for all practical purposes, already been charged with murder." Id. at 486.
119 Id. at 492. The Court found that the presence of counsel was necessary to advise
the petitioner of his rights during interrogation. Id. at 486. Rights not declared during
the interrogation process may be lost forever. Id. The Court reiterated the petitioner's
need for counsel with its conclusion that "what happened at this interrogation could
certainly 'affect the whole trial.'" Id. (citing Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 59
(1961)).
120 Id. at 477.
121 The Gouveia majority noted that the decision in Miranda was based on the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination as opposed to the sixth amendment
right to counsel. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2298 n.5. Accordingly, the majority asserted that
Miranda's holding that an individual is entitled to the assistance of counsel prior to the
initiation of adversary proceedings under the fifth amendment does not necessarily con-
tradict Gouveia's holding that the right to counsel attaches at or after the commencenment
of judicial proceedings under the sixth amendment. Id. Although analytically precise,
this technical splitting of fifth and sixth amendment rights ignores the shared goal of
both constitutional provisions, ensuring the accused a fair trial. Wade, 388 U.S. at 226.
In fact, the Supreme Court has suggested that the reasoning in the right to counsel cases
decided under the fifth amendment may be applicable to cases decided under the sixth
amendment. Id.
122 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2297.
123 413 U.S. at 307-11.
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sentation by counsel at any interrogation that becomes accusatory,
instead of investigatory, to protect individual's rights from preju-
dice. 124 In Gouveia, Respondents clearly were accused before the in-
itiation of formal adversary proceedings. 25 In fact, during prison
interrogations, authorities told Respondents that they knew Re-
spondents were responsible for the prison murders. 26 Respon-
dents in Gouveia, moreover, were forced to stand alone against
experienced adversaries during potentially prejudicial proceedings
before the formal criminal prosecution commenced. 127 Thus, ac-
cording to Ash, Escobedo, and Miranda, Respondents in Gouveia were
entitled to the assistance of counsel during their isolation in the
ADU.
B. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to departing from the principles established in its
prior decisions, the Court's holding in Gouveia that the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel attaches only at or after the commencement of
formal adversary proceedings ignored two important policy consid-
erations. First, the sixth amendment guarantee of counsel was
designed to ensure that individuals are not forced to stand alone
against the State during the prosecution.' 28 Specifically, the Court
has recognized that defendants confronted with the substantive and
procedural intricacies of the law generally do not have the skills re-
quired to effectively defend themselves. 29 In addition, laymen lack
the expertise needed to respond to the prosecution of professional
124 See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of Escobedo; supra
notes 120-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of Miranda.
125 See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
126 See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
127 See infra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.
128 See supra note 36. The government claimed that an inmate is not forced to stand
alone during an investigation in prison. Brief for United States, supra note 8. The in-
mate may select any prison staff member to assist him during the proceeding. Id. In-
mates, however, have expressed concern that staff members may elicit information to
frame them instead of assist them. Id.
129 Ash, 413 U.S. at 309; see also Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 486. The Ash Court found that
'Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissable. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately
to prepare his defense, even though he have [sic] a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not
know how to establish his innocence.'
413 U.S. at 307 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 69).
796 [Vol. 75
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
counsel.130 Because defendants may be confronted with the
prosecutorial forces of the State before formal judicial proceedings
begin,13' the right to counsel should be available prior to the formal
initiation of the adversary process.
Second, the sixth amendment right to counsel seeks to ensure a
fair trial by protecting individuals' rights from being prejudiced. 132
Rights not asserted during pretrial proceedings may be irretrievably
lost.' 33 Thus, representation by counsel during the pretrial process
would help prevent prejudice to an accused's rights. In previous
decisions,' 34 moreover, the Court has concluded that the presence
of counsel when a suspect is being investigated "enhances the integ-
rity of the fact-finding" procedure.135 Counsel's presence during an
investigation can often facilitate a fair trial by preventing the legiti-
mate use of a discovery process from growing into unjust abuse. 36
In Gouveia, however, the majority found that the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel was not required to protect a suspect from the
potentially prejudicial effects of a delay by the government in the
initiation of formal charges.' 37 Instead, the majority held that the
fifth amendment due process guarantee and the statute of limita-
tions for each offense provide the suspect adequate protection
against prejudice. 38 Although the fifth amendment does seek to
guarantee the accused a fair trial by requiring the dismissal of a case
against him should the delay in the commencement of formal pro-
130 Ash, 413 U.S. at 309. The assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment attempts to minimize the State's advantage when the accused is confronted with
the experience of a professional prosecutor. Id.; see also Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462-63.
131 See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
132 See supra note 36.
133 See supra note 119.
134 See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436; Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 478.
135 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466.
136 Id. Those who oppose providing individuals with counsel before formal judicial
proceedings commence claim that the availability of appointed counsel during that time
would reduce the number of confessions obtained by police. See Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court in
Escobedo, however, rejected this argument. The Court found that
[n]o system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to
consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the
exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law en-
forcement, then there is something very wrong with the system.
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490 (emphasis in original). In Wade, the Court emphasized that
"counsel can hardly impede legitimate law enforcement; on the contrary,. . . law en-
forcement may be assisted by preventing the infiltration of taint in the prosecution's
evidence." Wade, 388 U.S. at 238.
137 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
138 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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ceedings prejudice the suspect's defense,13 9 the fifth amendment
does not protect an accused from the prejudice that may occur if he
is forced to stand alone against a State prosecutor during an adver-
sary confrontation. 140 Thus, the sixth amendment right to counsel
must be applied to protect the rights of an accused who is con-
fronted with the intricacies of the law and the expertise of a public
prosecutor prior to the actual commencement of adversary
proceedings.
Given the policy considerations of the sixth amendment right to
counsel, 14 1 the facts in Gouveia support the position that Respon-
dents in that case should have been appointed counsel prior to the
initiation of adversary proceedings. The facts in Gouveia indicate
that Respondents were "accused" during their isolation in the
ADU. 142 For example, Respondents' prison records state that they
were confined to the ADU "pending investigation or trial for a crim-
inal act."1 43 In addition, during the hearings inside the prison, au-
thorities concluded that Respondents were responsible for the
murders in question and informed Respondents of their conclu-
sion. 144 The government conceded, moreover, that had respon-
dents not been incarcerated at the time of the murders, police
139 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 65. The fifth amendment also fails to protect the interests of society
from prejudice. If a delay in the initiation of formal charges prejudices a suspect's de-
fense, the fifth amendment requires the dismissal of the case against the suspect. See
supra notes 65, 68 and accompanying text. Thus, the fifth amendment forces a court to
choose between hearing a prejudice-free case and convicting the guilty. See Amsterdam,
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 388-89 (1964). Al-
ternatively, the sixth amendment seeks to protect an individual's rights from prejudice
without letting a guilty person go unpunished. By guaranteeing the accused the assist-
ance of counsel during the pretrial process, the sixth amendment helps insure a fair trial.
Brief for Gouveia, supra note 9. Thus, the sixth amendment prevents the prejudice that
prompts the fifth amendment to dismiss a case against an accused and instead facilitates
prejudice-free judicial proceedings through which a court can decide whether to punish
or release a suspect.
141 See supra notes 128, 132 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 12, 24, and 28; see also infra notes 143-47. In addition, the district
court deciding the Mills case held that "when the defendants were placed in segregation,
the finger of suspicion had already been pointed toward them." Mills, No. 80-278.
143 Id.; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7; Brief for United States,
supra note 8.
144 See supra notes 14, 24 and accompanying text. During the hearings, Respondents
repeatedly requested the assistance of appointed counsel. See supra notes 16-17, 24 and
accompanying text. Prison authorities denied their requests, however. Id. When the
petitioner's request to consult with his attorney was denied in Escobedo, the Court held
that the petitioner had become accused. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
Thus, prison officials' refusal to provide Respondents in Gouveia with appointed counsel




would have arrested them. 145 Such an arrest would have mandated
an adversary judicial proceeding and the appointment of counsel. 146
Thus, Respondents' isolation in the ADU served an accusatory func-
tion 147 and counsel should have been provided.
Respondents, moreover, clearly were confronted with the
prosecutorial forces of the State while they were confined to the
ADU without the assistance of counsel. For example, the FBI inter-
rogated respondents and subjected them to physical examinations
during their isolation. 148 Bureau of Prisons' authorities also ques-
tioned Respondents while they were confined to administrative de-
tention. 149 In addition, confining Respondents to administrative
segregation prejudiced their ability to prepare an adequate defense
because they were unable to investigate the criminal charges against
them. 150 The government, for example, interviewed witnesses,' 51
145 Mills, No. 80-278.
146 Id.
147 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2304 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148 See Mills, No. 80-278; see also Brief for Gouveia, supra note 9.
149 See Mills, No. 80-278; see also Brief for Gouveia, supra note 9.
150 See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text; supra notes 12-14, 24 and accompa-
nying text. In response to Respondents' plea for the assistance of counsel while con-
fined to the ADU, the government claimed that it was not clear that counsel would
contribute to Respondents' ability to develop an effective defense. See Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, supra note 7. The government contended that even inmates not confined
to the ADU find it difficult to develop a defense while an investigation is pending against
them. Id. Moreover, the government noted that providing the assistance of counsel
prior to the formal initiation of adversary proceedings presented three additional
problems: (1) federal authorities would need to develop new procedures to guide the
assignment of appointed counsel to inmates; (2) the presence of counsel in prison dur-
ing an investigation could disrupt the institution's routine; and (3) the government lacks
the additional funds required to provide inmates with counsel before formal proceed-
ings commence against them. Id.
151 While Respondents were isolated in the ADU without the assistance of counsel, it
was clear that the government actively was conducting an investigation of the prison
murders. In connection with the Mills case, for example, the government interviewed
over 145 witnesses. See Mills, No. 80-278. The government also interviewed over 100
witnesses in connection with Trejo's murder. See Brief for Gouveia, supra note 9. By the
time Respondents were appointed counsel at arraignment, however, many of their po-
tential witnesses were no longer confined to the Federal Correctional Institution in
Lompoc. See Brief for United States, supra note 8. As Gouveia's attorney pointed out, 62
of the 67 prisoners who might have been present during Trejo's murder were released
from Lompoc by the time Gouveia was appointed counsel. Brief for Gouveia, supra note
9. Because respondents knew most of the inmates by nickname only, it would be virtu-
ally impossible to locate those individuals who were no longer confined in Lompoc to
ask them to testify. Mills, No. 80-278. Even if the former inmates could be located,
witnesses' memories are likely to fade during an extended delay between the incident
and questioning. Id.; see also Brief for United States, supra note 8; Brief for Gouveia,
supra note 9. Thus, Respondents' lengthy detention in the ADU without representation
by counsel resulted in prejudicial effects at trial. See Brief for Gouveia, supra note 9.
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memorialized testimony,1 52 and preserved physical evidence 53 dur-
ing Respondents' extended isolation in the ADU. By the time Re-
spondents were appointed counsel, however, witnesses and physical
evidence critical to Respondents' defense were unavailable.1 54
Moreover, during oral argument, the government conceded that if
Respondents had been represented by appointed counsel while they
were confined in administrative detention, their ability to mount an
effective defense against the government, if charged, would have
been enhanced. 155
Thus, the majority's decision in Gouveia also is inconsistent with
the Court's emphasis on guaranteeing assistance of counsel when-
ever necessary to assure the accused a fair trial. 156 By limiting the
right to counsel to incidents following the formal commencement of
judicial proceedings, the majority forces an individual to stand alone
against the State at critical, potentially prejudical pretrial events.' 57
IV. CONCLUSION
In Gouveia, the Court relied on its prior decisions in holding
that a person is not entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel
prior to the formal initiation of adversary proceedings. Those deci-
sions, however, do not support the majority's position. Instead, the
language of earlier decisions extends the right to counsel to critical
events that occur before formal judicial proceedings begin. The
Court's decision, moreover, conflicts with the policy considerations
that emphasize the importance of assuring the accused that they
may obtain an effective defense and a fair trial, and that they need
not stand alone against the State. Indeed, a close examination of
the facts in Gouveia indicates that Respondents were "accused" dur-
ing their extended isolation in administrative detention. More im-
portant, representation by counsel during that period would have
protected Respondents' rights from prejudice and guaranteed them
the assistance of counsel during confrontations with the adversary
152 Respondents also claimed that they were prejudiced because without the assist-
ance of counsel, they were unable to memorialize the testimony of witnesses needed for
trial. Brief for Gouveia, supra note 9. Although the government's files are usually avail-
able to an inmate, the contents were withheld from Respondents in this case because
they were classified as confidential. Id. Respondents' counsel found, moreover, that the
limited amount of government information disclosed was unreliable. Id.
153 Because of the lengthy delay before they were appointed counsel, Respondents
complained they were unable to preserve physical evidence that would have been benefi-
cial to their defense at trial. See Mills, No. 80-278; see also Brief for Gouveia, supra note 9.
154 See supra notes 151 and 153.
155 See Brief for United States, supra note 8.
156 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
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forces of the State. Thus, the majority in Gouveia erred when it con-
cluded that Respondents' sixth amendment rights were not violated
during their extended isolation in administrative detention.
DEBORAH L. YALOWITZ
